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Abstract 
 
The dramatic rise and fall of the Japanese equity market provides a unique opportunity to 
examine market-and firm-specific risks over different market conditions.  The price 
behavior of Japanese equities in the 1990s is found to resemble that of U.S. equities 
during the Great Depression.  Both show increasing market volatility and a prolonged 
large co-movement in equity prices.  What is unique about the Japanese case is the 
surprising fall in firm-level volatility and turnover in Japanese stocks after its market 
crash in 1990.  This large decrease in firm-level volatility may have impeded Japan’s 
capital formation process as it has become more difficult over the past decade for both 
investors and managers to separate high quality from low quality firms.  Using data on 
firm performance fundamentals and corporate bankruptcies, we show that the fall in firm-
level volatility and turnover could be attributed to the sharp increase in earnings 
homogeneity among Japanese firms and the lack of corporate restructuring.  
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 It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of 
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the spring of hope, it was 
the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing 
before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct 
the other way.      –Charles Dickens, “A Tale of Two Cities” 
  
The chronic stagnation of the Japanese economy is a big puzzle.  Once a shining 
light for both developing and industrialized nations, it has now become a basket case for 
bubble economies.  Twelve years after its stock market bubble burst, a once mighty 
country is still operating far below its potential productive capacity.  While numerous 
arguments have been advanced to explain the recent plight of the Japanese economy, 
most have focused on lack of consumer demand, collapsing asset values, and non-
performing loans.1  This paper offers a unique perspective by studying the role of 
Japanese equity markets.  A comparison of the Japanese case to the U.S. market during 
the Great Depression reveals important similarities and differences that may contribute to 
our understanding of the prolonged economic stagnation in Japan.  Specifically, while 
there are great similarities in the market volatility and correlation structure of equities, the 
behavior of firm-specific volatility of Japanese equities exhibits important differences.   
 Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) were the first to provide a 
comprehensive study of idiosyncratic risk for U.S. stocks.  During the period from 1962 
to 1997, they discovered a noticeable increase in firm-level volatility relative to market 
volatility.  Moreover, they found that all volatility measures (market, industry, and firm) 
move together counter-cyclically in the U.S.  In other words, firm-level volatility tends to 
increase during a recession.  In contrast to the U.S. experience, this paper reports a sharp 
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 reduction in firm-level volatility immediately following the Japanese market crash, and 
an increase in market-wide volatility.  
In order to understand the abnormal behavior of idiosyncratic risk in Japan, we 
examine the impact of firm performance fundamentals as well as bankruptcy on firm-
level volatility.  We find that fundamental performances of firms are tied more closely 
together during the post-crash period.  We also discover a positive correlation between 
changes in aggregate firm-level volatility and corporate bankruptcies.  There is some 
circumstantial evidence that increasing bankruptcies after 1997 have led to higher firm-
level volatility.  In addition, we find idiosyncratic volatility for firms with business group 
affiliations is less responsive to economic conditions than that of firms without such 
affiliations.  All these results suggest that the sharp fall in firm-level volatility could be 
due to group protection. 
 This anomalous behavior of firm-level volatility may help us understand the poor 
performance of the Japanese economy over the last decade.  Disaggregated volatility 
measures could impact aggregate output in several ways.  
 First, macroeconomic models of “cleansing recessions,” such as those described 
by Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Eden and Jovanovic (1994), emphasize the 
impact of firm-level volatility on resource allocation during recession.  A recession may 
increase the arrival rate of information about management quality and thus increase 
resource reallocation from low quality to high quality firms.  Such resource reallocation 
is enhanced in the U.S. because firm-level volatility moves counter-cyclically.  To the 
extent that Japanese market downturns are accompanied by a reduction in firm-level 
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 volatility, it makes it more difficult for investors to distinguish low quality from high 
quality firms, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the cleansing mechanism. 
 Second, recent finance studies demonstrate that a reduction in firm-level volatility 
may affect the capital allocation process.  Wurgler (2000) presents evidence that 
countries with stock markets that impound more firm-specific information into individual 
stock prices exhibit a better allocation of capital.  Wurgler suggests that efficient 
secondary market prices can help investors and managers distinguish good investments 
from bad ones.2  Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2001) also find that firms in industries with 
greater firm-specific return variation exhibit a higher quality of capital budgeting, in that 
their profitability indices (marginal Q ratios) are closer to one (or to a tax-adjusted 
benchmark). 
 This paper builds on the growing literature exploring the relationship between 
financial markets and economic growth.3  While it is based on the methodology 
developed by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), we have introduced a number of 
innovations.  First, we broaden the approach by considering volatility behavior under 
different economic conditions.  Second, we use firm-level volatility in the Japanese 
market to study the capital allocation issue in down markets.  Third, we extend the work 
of Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) to cover the U.S. market during the1928-
1946 time period.  
                                                 
2 See also Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) and Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2002).  
3 King and Levine (1993), Levine (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998), Beck, Levine, and Loayza (1999), 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) demonstrate that firms in financially developed countries grow 
faster. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that industries that are externally financed grow faster in financially 
developed countries. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) discover that economic growth increases in states that 
have less stringent intrastate banking restrictions.  
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  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section I provides a brief 
description of the data and the various specifications for estimating firm-specific 
volatilities, including a simple market model, the Fama and French (1993) three factor-
model, the Xu and Malkiel (2001) approach, as well as a multi-factor APT model.  
Section II presents our main empirical results.  In Section III we explore relations 
between firm-level volatility and institutional features unique to Japan, such as keiretsu 
and the main bank system.  Section IV describes the implications of the findings, 
particularly in comparison with the pre-WWII U.S. market.  Section V offers concluding 
comments. 
 
I. Measuring Idiosyncratic Volatility 
A. Data and Background 
Much of modern finance theory strives to establish a quantitative relationship 
between risk and return.  In some sense, the success of each theory hinges on measuring 
risk.  In general, there are two types of risks for individual securities: systematic risk, 
which is determined by common risk factors; and idiosyncratic risk, which is the residual 
risk.  Since idiosyncratic risk can be diversified in standard finance theory, its role has 
been largely ignored.  Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) suggest that 
idiosyncratic volatility has increased substantially over the past decade due to the trading 
behavior of institutional investors and the pursuit of growth objectives by many 
individual companies (see also Xu and Malkiel, 2001).  In this paper, we take a new look 
at the evolution of idiosyncratic risk after the Japanese market crash. 
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  In order to examine all stocks listed on the First and Second Sections of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), we draw on data from different sources.  Monthly data on 
individual stock returns and volume and annual financial statements (for book value of 
equity) are from the PACAP Japan database.  Short-term interest rates are from updates 
of the database presented in Hamao (1991).  GDP and industrial production data are from 
the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.  The Nomura Research Institute 
and Tokyo Shoko Research provide bankruptcy data. 
This study covers the period from 1975 to 1999.   The entire sample period is 
divided into five 5-year periods.  The first two periods (1975-1979 and 1980-1984) are 
before the bubble; the third (1985-1989) is the bubble period, and the last two periods 
(1990-1994 and 1995-1999) correspond to the post-crash era.  The numbers of stocks in 
each sub-period are 1174, 1275, 1368, 1521, and 1607, respectively. 
While a thorough account of Japanese economic history during this sample period 
is beyond the scope of this paper, we provide a brief summary of events as background 
information. 
After a post-World War II high-growth period (1956-1973, average annual GDP 
growth rate of 9.2%), Japan entered a lower growth period, triggered by the oil crises.  
The average annual GDP growth rate during the period from 1974 to 1990 was 3.8%.  
Our sample period starts in 1975, which is around the beginning of this medium-growth 
period.  In the latter period of our sample, Japan’s growth rate dropped further to an 
average of 1.3% (1991-2000).  This low- or no-growth period corresponds with the 
aftermath of the crash of the financial market bubble. 
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 Soon after the Plaza Accord of 1985, the value of the yen rapidly appreciated 
against the U.S. dollar from 250yen/$ in May 1985 to 170yen/$ in May 1986, and then to 
144yen/$ in May 1987.  Facing such currency appreciation, Japan, traditionally 
dependent on exports, needed to stimulate domestic demand in order to avoid recession.  
The Bank of Japan took a decidedly low interest rate policy.  The official discount rate 
was lowered to 2.5% in February 1987 and was not raised until 1989.  In addition to this 
expansive monetary policy, credit in general was easy to obtain.  Banks were heavily 
protected by the Ministry of Finance through the so-called “convoy system,” which 
essentially guaranteed that no bank would fail.  Given this implicit government guarantee 
and the loose corporate governance that resulted from cross-shareholding, the Japanese 
banking system found itself in a situation of moral hazard.  Banks and their affiliated 
financial institutions easily funded stock and land speculators as well as businesses with 
optimistic expansion plans.  Stock and land prices soared, but the general price level 
remained stable. 
Interest rates were finally raised in 1989 and 1990 in order to contain the bubble.  
The market started to crash in 1990, and bank balance sheets deteriorated with bad loans.  
Since then Japan has been slow in dealing with the problems that arose in the aftermath 
of the bubble collapse.  Although the banking problem had been well recognized since 
the early 1990s, it was not publicly acknowledged until the first failure of a major bank 
(Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, in November 1997).  In late 1998, two more major banks 
(Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank) ultimately failed and were 
nationalized.  In March 1998, 15 major banks reluctantly received injections of tax 
money totaling 7.45 trillion yen.  The bad loan problem has not improved much since 
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 then, as the economy went into another round of recession.  Ongoing discussion of the 
necessity of a second round of bank bailouts continues.  The public press often refers to 
the 1990s as Japan’s  “lost decade.” 
 
B: Model Specification 
 Since our study focuses on idiosyncratic risk, we use idiosyncratic volatility to 
measure it directly.   Unlike total volatility, uncovering idiosyncratic volatility requires 
the use of an asset pricing model.  As a start, we use the popular market model to 
decompose the total return into systematic and idiosyncratic components.  That is, we run 
the following model, 
,)( ,,,,,, titftMimitfti RRRR εβα +−+=−                               (1) 
where , , are the individual stock return, the value-weighted market return, 
and the risk-free rate, respectively.  We measure idiosyncratic volatility using the root 
mean square of residuals, 
tiR , tMR , tfR ,
ti,ε . 
 The market model may be misspecified if we fail to measure the market return or 
if other risk factors exist, as suggested by the APT model.  Despite the fact that we 
cannot perfectly rationalize the factors used in Fama and French (1993), their three-factor 
model is considered as  “state of art” from an empirical perspective.  Furthermore, Chan, 
Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) and Daniel, Titman, and Wei (2000) document that size 
and book-to-market ratio are significant determinants of the cross-section of Japanese 
stock returns.  Therefore, we will also use the three-factor model to decompose the total 
return as, 
              ,)( ,,,,,,,,,, titHMLiHMLtSMBiSMBtftMimitfti RRRRRR εβββα +++−+=−             (2) 
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 where , , are the return proxies for the size variable and the book-to-market 
variable, respectively.  Again, idiosyncratic volatility is computed as the root mean 
square of residuals, 
tSMBR , tHMLR ,
ti,ε .  We have followed the exact procedure of Fama and French 
(1993) to construct the two proxies for the size and book-to-market variables. 
 Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) have proposed a model-free 
decomposition procedure based on daily data.  This approach applies only to computing 
the total aggregate idiosyncratic volatility, which is the focus of this paper.  Since this 
study uses monthly stock returns, we follow a modified approach developed by Xu and 
Malkiel (2001).   Specifically, the total aggregate volatility  is calculated by value 
weighting an individual stock’s total volatility .  The aggregate idiosyncratic 
volatility  is then computed as the difference between the total aggregate volatility 
and the market volatility.
2
TVσ
2
,TViσ
2
IVσ
4 
 Whether we use the market model or the Fama and French three-factor model, it 
is still possible that our measurement of idiosyncratic volatility includes other missed 
factors.  Therefore, we extend our analysis by utilizing multi-factor asset pricing models.  
Recent empirical work by Cremers and Mei (2002) shows a close relationship between 
idiosyncratic volatility and turnover in the U.S. data.  To confirm our results regarding 
Japanese idiosyncratic volatility, this paper also applies the duo-factor model of Lo and 
Wang (2000) in constructing idiosyncratic volatility and turnover measures. (See 
appendix for details and the estimation procedure).  
                                                 
4 Since volatilities in general are unobservable, we apply rolling statistics as used in Xu and Malkiel (2001) 
to estimate them efficiently.  The optimal weights are suggested by Foster and Nelson (1999) with a 
functional form of e-αt, where αT= 3 .  In particular, we choose window length T=12 for our monthly 
return as suggested in Xu and Malkiel (2001).  This approach estimates both the total volatility and the 
market volatility. 
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II. Time-Varying Market Volatility and Idiosyncratic Volatility  
A fascinating fact about the post-1962 U.S. equity market is that, while the overall 
market seems relatively calm, idiosyncratic volatility has shown a steady increase over 
the past decade.  Although the financial world has become increasingly integrated, the 
Japanese equity market has gone through different cycles.  It is therefore of interest to 
examine this issue with respect to the Japanese equity market.  
 
A.  Examining the Overall Market  
We first plot aggregate returns and trading volume of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, the market experienced a rapid run-up after 1985, and it peaked in 
December 1989.  This period, now widely known as the “bubble period,” was followed 
by a rapid decline of the market and a consequent series of ups and downs.  For 
simplicity, we will call the 1990-1994 period “the crash period” and the 1995-1999 
period “the post-crash period.”  In the 1990s, the index value stayed between ½ to 2/3 of 
its peak and there was a sharp fall in trading volume. 
 [Insert Figure 1 approximately here] 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics of the data.   The first item reported in Table 
1 is the mean and standard deviation of the value-weighted market return ( ).  The 
mean market return is positive in the first three periods, with a high 2.8% per month 
return in the 1985-1989 period.  In the last two periods, however, the market on average 
earned negative returns.  The standard deviation of market return shows a rising trend.  
Next, we report the cross-sectional median, mean, and standard deviation of individual 
MR
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 stock returns averaged over time ( ).  The mean and median of show a similar 
pattern to that of the market return, but the standard deviation does not have a clear-cut 
trend as the market index does.    
_
iR
_
iR
 [Insert Table 1 approximately here] 
The next three columns of Table 1 report the results of the market model 
estimation for individual stocks.  We first notice a significant reduction in the cross-
sectional variation of firm betas, βi,CAPM, from 0.447 to 0.321 from the bubble period to 
the crash period.  We also note a remarkable change in the R2 of the market model.  On 
average it is 13% and 10% in the earlier, pre-bubble periods, but increases to 17% during 
the bubble period, and jumps dramatically to 51% in the period immediately following 
the market peak.  Although it decreases somewhat in the last period, the market model 
explains on average 39% of the variation of individual stocks.   
One might suspect that the market “bubble” caused stocks to move in the same 
direction, as investors in general may have expected similar returns on stocks with 
different characteristics.  But the further increased explanatory power of the value-
weighted index after the burst of the bubble indicates that Japanese stocks started to move 
together with the whole market, even when the market started to decline and the economy 
suffered from recession.  In these years, individual stocks lost much of their contribution 
of idiosyncratic risk to total risk.  This is in contrast to results obtained in the U.S. as 
reported by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), who find that firm-level volatility 
is higher in NBER-dated recessions. 
 The sixth column in Table 1 shows the cross-sectional distribution of the 
idiosyncratic component of volatility ( IVi,σ ), as measured by the mean square of 
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 residuals.  We note a slightly increased idiosyncratic volatility in the bubble period 
(0.106), followed by a sharp fall to 0.080 in the crash period, and then a recovery to 0.093 
in the post-crash period.  In addition, we observe more than a 50% decrease in the 
variation of IVi,σ during the crash period, dropping from 0.039 to 0.024.  Total volatility 
( TVi,σ ) reported in the seventh column is the return volatility of individual stocks 
measured over each period.  While total volatility changed little from the bubble to the 
post-crash periods, we notice a 25% drop in the variation of TVi,σ during the crash period, 
falling from 0.038 to 0.029. 
iη
Table 1 also presents summary statistics for market capitalization and turnover.  
The size of Japanese companies increased during the first four periods, but decreased in 
the last period.  Average turnover iη of stocks was high (0.056) until the collapse of the 
bubble (1989) and then decreased significantly to 0.027 afterwards.  In addition, there is 
also a significant drop in the variation of iη , changing from 0.039 in the bubble period to 
0.022 in the crash period.  The simultaneous fall in IVi,σ , the variation of TVi,σ , and the 
variation of all suggest a much stronger presence of the market factor in both stock 
returns and trading volume during the crash period.    
To further investigate the significant shift in the characteristics of Japanese firms 
during the bubble-burst period, we performed simple mean tests for levels and F tests for 
variances for each sub-period in comparison with the bubble-burst period.  The results of 
these tests are presented in Table 2.  First, as evidenced by the low variation in beta (see 
third column in Table 2), differences among systematic risk of individual firms appear to 
have dropped significantly.  At the same time, both the level of aggregate idiosyncratic 
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 volatility and the differences in idiosyncratic volatilities among different firms have gone 
down significantly over this period.  This suggests that each firm’s contribution to market 
risk and its innovative activities are alike.   
 [Insert Table 2 approximately here] 
 
B.  The Dynamic Behavior of Market and Idiosyncratic Volatility  
The summary statistics provide a strong indication of the differences in behavior 
of the volatility components.  Figure 2 shows the 12-month moving average of both the 
monthly market volatility and the monthly aggregated idiosyncratic volatility.  Through 
this visual presentation, we can detect a trend of increasing market volatility (the solid 
line) with a large jump at the time of the crash in 1990/1991.  Consistent with the 
summary statistics presented in Table 1, volatility increased during the bubble period as 
compared to previous years, and remained higher during the period of market decline in 
the 1990s.   
 [Insert Figure 2 approximately here] 
 While market-wide volatility in Japan appears to have increased after 1985, we 
also see a decreasing trend in the behavior of idiosyncratic volatility.  There is, however, 
a noticeable jump in the last two years, during the period when the Japanese financial 
system experienced unprecedented stress and reorganization (e.g., bank failures and 
government bailouts).5  Aggregate trading volume was also higher during the boom 
period, but since then has decreased to the lowest level in the entire sample.  These 
figures are shown in Figure 1 in monthly frequency. 
                                                 
5 Kang and Stulz (2000) document that bank-dependent firms suffered more than others in Japan in early 
1990s. 
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  Both market and aggregated idiosyncratic volatilities seem to be quite persistent.  
The observed trends may be due to persistency in the data, or the volatilities could be 
non-stationary.  Therefore, a careful econometric analysis is necessary for drawing any 
definite conclusions.  Since volatility is non-negative, we test the unit root hypothesis on 
log volatilities.  In particular, the following model is estimated in order to apply the 
augmented-Dickey-Fuller test: 
ln(σt) = µ + ρ ln(σt-1) + γ t + α1 ∆ln(σt-1) + … + α6 ∆ln(σt-6)  + εt     .                      (3) 
We first study the whole sample period from 1975 to 1999.  Since most of the abnormal 
behavior in idiosyncratic volatility occurs in the post-bubble era, we also test 
idiosyncratic volatility for the sub-sample period from 1985 to 1997.  All results are 
reported in Table 3.  Apparently the second stock market crash in October 1990 had a 
larger impact than the first crash in October 1987.  This raises the issue of whether this 
one-time event may be overshadowing the rest of the sample and distorting some of the 
results.  In order to reduce the impact of this outlier, we replace the October 1990 
observation with the second largest observation in the data set.  This admittedly ad hoc 
procedure allows us to decrease the influence of the crash while allowing it to remain in the 
sample as an important event. 
 [Insert Table 3 approximately here] 
 For market volatility, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test clearly rejects the unit 
root hypothesis at a 5% significance level, which means that market volatility is in fact 
stationary.  At the same time, the linear trend is positive and statistically significant at a 
1% level.   Thus, in contrast, the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility ln(σIV) appears to be 
non-stationary, with augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics of -18.75 compared with the 
critical value of -24.5.  In addition, the trend coefficient is not statistically different from 
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 zero.  This conclusion is robust to different specifications of idiosyncratic volatility 
measures, such as ln(σCAPM,IV) and ln(σFF3F,IV), as shown in Table 3. 
 As Figure 2 shows, idiosyncratic volatility has behaved very differently in the 
post-bubble period.  The augmented Dickey-Fuller test strongly rejects the unit root 
hypothesis.  At the same time, there is a statistically significant downward trend in the 
idiosyncratic volatility.  This is also robust to other measures of idiosyncratic volatilities.   
Therefore, while the aggregate stock market volatility in Japan has trended upwards over 
the years, firm-level volatility decreased during the 1990s, except for two short episodes 
coinciding with the rapid decline of the market in1990/91, and the bank failures in 1998.  
 
C. Rising Correlation among Stock Returns and Turnover 
Although the evidence on decreasing idiosyncratic volatility and increasing 
market volatility is strong, we can further examine the issue from the perspective of the 
explanatory power of the market model, which is the R2 measure.6  Apparently, the 
dispersion between market volatility and idiosyncratic volatility implies an increase in the 
R2 for the market model.  In Figure 3a, we show the dynamics of average R2 statistics 
from the market model.  R2s for both returns and turnover are reported.  At time t, the 
return R2 is computed based on estimating the market model using the previous 24 
months of monthly data, and the turnover R2 is computed in a similar way from a single 
factor model.  We can see the return R2s peaked during 1994-1995 and then declined in 
the most recent years, but still remain higher than the level of the 1970s and 1980s. 
 [Insert Figure 3a and 3b approximately here] 
                                                 
6R2 = 1-(idiosyncratic volatility)/(total volatility).  Recently, there is an increasing application of average R2 
as a measure of market information inefficiency (see Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Durnev, Morck, Yeung, 
and Zarowin, 2002; and Wurgler, 2000).  Higher R2 implies that the market is less informationally efficient.   
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  Perhaps it is more interesting to examine the changing volatility issue from the 
correlation perspective.  If market volatility reflects the average covariance among 
individual stock returns, the observed phenomenon of decreasing idiosyncratic volatility 
could only happen when the average correlation increases.  We present correlations 
among individual stock excess returns and volume in Figure 3b.  At any time t, we 
compute the average of pair-wise correlations using the previous 24 months of monthly 
data.  As the figure shows, we find a clear pattern in the evolution of return and volume 
correlations: approximately 0.10 for returns and 0.05 for volume in the 1970s and 1980s.  
But in the 1990s, after the collapse of the bubble, the correlations increase significantly, 
to as high as 0.50 for returns, and 0.20 for volume.   
The correlation picture uncovers important characteristics about the Japanese 
market.  During the decline of the market and the contraction of the economy, stocks in 
the Japanese market lost their individuality and started to move together, making it more 
difficult to separate the good firms from the bad.  Faced with stocks that were not very 
distinguishable from each other, more and more companies were treated like “lemons” by 
Japanese market investors.  This behavior may have prevented capital from flowing into 
good companies to support innovations and continued competitiveness, thus weakening 
their ability to sustain economy-wide shocks.  The resulting increased vulnerability of 
firms may have induced higher overall market volatility.  As Figure 2 suggests, Japanese 
investors have faced rising aggregate market risk in the 1990s. 
 
D. Idiosyncratic Risk and R2 in a Multi-Factor Model  
 
 
15 
 
 We now confirm the above results by explicitly testing the duo-factor model 
(outlined in the Appendix) using monthly returns and turnover data for TSE securities 
from 1975 to 1999.  Table 4 provides the results of the test across a number of factors in 
excess return and turnover, including incremental R2 from the k-th factor of the return 
and turnover for models for 1 to 10 factors.  The first principal component of returns 
explains 14% and 11% of the normalized excess returns in the 1975-1979 and 1980-1984 
periods, which increases to 18% during the bubble period, followed by dramatic increases 
to 52% (1990-1994) and 39% (1995-1999) in the post-bubble periods.  These findings 
indicate that during a period of market decline, excess returns are largely driven by a 
single systematic factor, and are consistent with our previous results showing rising 
market risk during the post-bubble period.7 
 [Insert Table 4 approximately here] 
 The last column of Table 4 shows the average R2 of regressing individual stock 
returns and turnover on their corresponding systematic factors for each period.  In the 
first period, a three-factor model explains on average 25% of variation of stock returns 
and a four-factor model explains 31% of variation of turnovers.  These R2s go up slightly 
for the 1985-1989 period, suggesting a small rise in commonality in time-series 
variations of both stock returns and volumes.  However, we find a significant increase in 
average R2s in the 1990-1994 and 1995-1999 periods for both returns and turnovers.  
This indicates that during the post-bubble period, there is a sharp decrease in contribution 
                                                 
7 Table 4 also reports the number of factors in excess returns and turnover, determined by using a loss 
function suggested by Xu (2001).  Our results show that there are 3 factors in excess returns in Japan, 
except for the 1990-94 period where there are 4 factors.  The number of factors in excess returns remains 
relatively stable, whereas for turnover, it varies between 3 and 6.  However, our main interest here is to 
derive measures of idiosyncratic volatility and not to provide a test of the hypothesis that there is the same 
number of factors in return and turnover in the duo-factor model.  
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 of idiosyncratic risk in stock returns and trading volume, further confirming our previous 
results. 
 Cremers and Mei (2002) report a close relationship between idiosyncratic 
volatility and idiosyncratic turnover, based on the rationale that idiosyncratic volatility 
tends to be driven by firm-specific information on firm cash flows and risk, which also 
drives firm-specific trading volume.  To the extent that Japanese idiosyncratic turnover 
displays a similar reduction during the crash period, our results showing a surprising 
decrease in firm-level volatility during the same time period are further strengthened.   
 In summary, by examining the Japanese stock market over three periods (pre-
bubble, bubble and post-crash), we have documented different levels of total and 
idiosyncratic volatility over time.  Total volatility increased after the collapse of the 
bubble, but, at the same time, idiosyncratic components significantly decreased.  This 
stands in sharp contrast with the post-1962 U.S. market where market-level volatility 
does not show significant change over time, although firm-level volatility increases over 
time, especially during recessions (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)).   
 
III. Why Did Idiosyncratic Volatility Fall after 1990? 
 
We have so far documented increased market-wide volatility and decreased firm-
level volatility in Japan.  In this section, we relate these findings to the economic 
environment of Japan, and particularly to some institutional factors that may be driving 
these phenomena. 
 
A: An Introduction to “Japanese-Style” Capitalism 
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 The post-WWII Japanese economic system was centered on a “main bank” 
system in which major banks played an important, and quasi-public-sector role in 
supplying much needed capital for building the economy after the devastation and 
destruction of the war.  Thus, major banks were at the core of all Japanese industrial 
groups (keiretsu).  Main banks not only made loans to the keiretsu group, but also owned 
up to 10% (5% after 1977) of client firms (many of them in the keiretsu group).  
Furthermore, main banks often sent directors to borrowing firms, especially when they 
were experiencing financial difficulties, and the monitoring capability of banks was 
believed to be effective (Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard, 1994).  Main banks also provided 
much-needed liquidity for financially distressed firms, thus reducing the cost of financial 
distress (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990).  In addition, since bankruptcy 
procedures in Japan were quite time-consuming and expensive, and once filed, conferred 
immediate control to court-appointed trustees, managers had a strong incentive not to 
resort to them.  As a result, as shown later, there were very few cases of bankruptcies of 
large, publicly traded firms in Japan.   
While the Japanese model appeared to function well through the high-growth 
period, one can argue that it was not able to meet the challenges of the changing 
environment in the 1990s.  Instead, the system created an excuse for staying with the 
status quo rather than implementing timely reforms.  After the collapse of the bubble, 
many corporations faced problems, such as high leverage resulting from overly optimistic 
expansion plans during the bubble period, decreased collateral value owing to the decline 
in land values, and decline in revenues due to economic slowdown.  However, corporate 
managers did not address these issues quickly.  It is possible that their previous strong 
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 ties with main banks led them to believe that negotiated financial support, rather than 
legal bankruptcy procedures, would be possible and desirable.8 
Financial regulators were also slow to reveal the problem of non-performing 
loans.  Rather than facing the issue, they chose to use “easy” criteria for classifying non-
performing loans in their published statistics, delaying immediate and necessary reforms.  
Since banks were not directly writing off the non-performing loans, troubled borrowers 
were not forced to go bankrupt.  Even firms widely recognized to be in serious financial 
distress for more than five years (e.g., large construction companies and some retail 
concerns) are still receiving support from banks.  The practice of lifetime employment in 
large corporations is another element that has made it difficult for the skilled labor force 
to move from inefficient to more productive sectors. 
 
B. The Relationship between Bankruptcy and Idiosyncratic Risk 
Protection among keiretsu and main bank affiliated firms and the lack of reform 
in Japan’s corporate sector may have led to a lack of “creative destruction” in the 
Japanese economy.  Figures 4a and 4b compare bankruptcies of all firms in the economy 
and those of the Tokyo Stock Exchange listed firms.9  As the figures reveal, the number 
of bankruptcies for firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange is much smaller than the 
number for the entire economy.  Among the former, there were only one to three 
bankruptcies per year from 1975 to 1996, with the exception of 1984 when there were 
                                                 
8 Nissan Motor, for example, asked for help from its main bank (Industrial Bank of Japan) over several 
years until at the end, in 1999, the French automaker Renault bought a substantial share of Nissan and sent 
a CEO to initiate a drastic restructuring.  At the time of this transaction, analysts widely agreed that Nissan 
was actually insolvent.   
9 For the economy as a whole, the number of bankruptcies increased gradually from 1975 to 1984, but 
decreased during the “bubble” boom period (1985-1990).  The number started to increase again after the 
collapse of the bubble.    
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 five bankruptcies.  In many years there were no bankruptcies at all.  Indeed, from 1987 to 
1991 (from the boom period to the beginning of the declining period), for five 
consecutive years, there were no bankruptcies.  This low bankruptcy phenomenon 
continued until 1996, well into the period of economic downturn.  It was only after 1997 
that the number of bankruptcies started to increase, but even then the number remained 
below 10 per year.  This is in sharp contrast with the U.S., where in 2000 (2001), there 
were 176 (257) bankruptcy filings of publicly traded companies.10  Bankruptcies of listed 
firms in Japan are particularly low since such firms are considered to have social and 
economic importance, and all parties involved (banks, other businesses, and regulators) 
deem them to be “too large to fail.” 
 [Insert Figure 4a,b approximately here] 
The Japanese stock market mirrored this period of procrastination.  Since 
immediate restructuring of corporations and banks was not forthcoming, investors may 
have come to expect a prolonged period of corporate “bailouts and rescues” where cash 
flows from good firms are diverted to save weak firms in the same business group and to 
converge economic risk.  Thus, we should observe a convergence of stock market returns 
and a reduction in firm-level volatility.  This implies a positive relation between number 
of bankruptcies and idiosyncratic risk, and a negative relation between number of 
bankruptcies and market co-movement. 
 [Insert Table 5 approximately here] 
To confirm the above hypothesis, we regress changes in firm-level volatility on 
the number of corporate bankruptcies of TSE listed firms and the annual growth rate of 
GDP.  We use annual data for this regression and report the results in Table 5.  Changes 
                                                 
10 See http://www.bankruptcydata.com/ 
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 in annual aggregate idiosyncratic risk are computed as changes in the 12-month average 
of the cross-sectional mean of idiosyncratic volatility obtained from the market model.  
For the full sample period, we find a weak positive relation between changes in firm-
level volatility and corporate bankruptcies; the higher number of bankruptcies is related 
to higher idiosyncratic volatility.  We also regress changes in average R2 and average 
pair-wise correlations on the number of corporate bankruptcies of TSE firms and GDP 
growth.  Generally we find a negative relation between number of bankruptcies and 
changes in average R2 and average pair-wise correlations.  However, the relation between 
average R2 and GDP growth is mixed.11 
 
C: The Impact of Business Group Affiliation on Idiosyncratic Risk 
We have argued that a lack of creative destruction (bankruptcies) may have 
caused Japanese firm-level volatility to decrease during the 1990s.  We now turn our 
attention to differences in the behavior of idiosyncratic volatility of keiretsu and non-
keiretsu firms, and firms with and without main banks.  Our purpose is to examine 
whether these unique Japanese institutional features play a role in determining the firm-
level components of volatility and volume. 
We first divide our sample into firms that belong to the six major keiretsu groups 
(Fuji, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Daiichi-Kangyo, Sumitomo, and Sanwa), and firms that do not.  
We also divide the sample into firms that have a main bank affiliation and firms that do 
not.  The classification is based on 1998 data in Kigyo Keiretsu Soran (1999), published 
by Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha.  We compute individual idiosyncratic components of return 
                                                 
11 We also run these regressions for the 1990-1999 sub-period.  The coefficients show a pattern consistent 
with the full sample.  These results are available upon request.  
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 volatility and volume of these firms, and average them across firms within each category 
(keiretsu firms and non-keiretsu firms; and firms with main banks and firms without main 
banks) to obtain aggregate idiosyncratic components.12   We then regress the difference in 
aggregate idiosyncratic components between non-keiretsu firms and keiretsu firms on the 
monthly growth rate of industrial production (IP). We include an intercept to control for 
the difference in idiosyncratic components due to differences in industrial composition.  
Table 6 reports regression results for the difference in idiosyncratic components 
of return volatility and volume between non-keiretsu firms and keiretsu firms (Panel A), 
and between firms with main banks and firms without main banks (Panel B).  We report 
results for before the collapse of the bubble (high- and medium-economic growth 
periods), and the post-bubble (low-growth period).  Noting that there is a reversal in the 
pattern of idiosyncratic risk around 1997, we report results for the 1990-1996 period. 
The results for the 1977-1989 period in Panel A show a generally positive relation 
between IP growth and the difference in idiosyncratic components; an increase in IP 
growth tends to increase the difference of firm-level volatility between non-keiretsu and 
keiretsu firms.  A higher growth rate of the IP implies higher firm-level volatility and 
volume of non-keiretsu firms compared to keiretsu firms.  This means that, in this sub-
period, when economic growth is at a high rate, there tends to be greater disparity of 
stock performance among non-keiretsu firms.  Less disparity among the performance of 
stocks of keiretsu firms during the high-growth period implies the presence of resource 
sharing among these firms, whereas independent firms who do not share resources 
experience a higher degree of disparity in volatility.  Panel B shows that the same results 
                                                 
12 We have also used other single- and multi-factor models to compute idiosyncratic components. The 
results are quite similar and available upon request from the authors.  
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 hold for firms without main banks versus firms with main banks, and all coefficients are 
significant. 
When we run the same regressions for the 1990-1996 (post-crash period), the sign 
of the coefficients flips to negative, and they are all significant except for one case.  In 
this sub-period, a decrease in IP growth tends to increase the difference of firm-level 
components between non-keiretsu and keiretsu firms (Panel A) and between firms 
without main banks and firms with main banks (Panel B).  The lower the IP growth, the 
higher the firm-level components of non-keiretsu firms (firms without main banks) 
compared to keiretsu firms (firms with main banks).  This means that in this sub-period 
when the rate of economic growth is low, there tends to be greater disparity of stock 
performance among non-keiretsu firms and firms without main banks, compared to their 
counterparts.  These findings suggest that keiretsu firms and firms with main banks are 
less sensitive to negative economic conditions compared to independent firms.  
 
D: Increasing Homogeneity of Economic Performance among Japanese Firms 
While the above study has documented a falling firm-level volatility in Japanese 
stock returns, one may wonder if this phenomenon is driven by the underlying 
fundamentals of firm performance.  To address this question, Figures 5a and 5b report the 
average 10-year pair-wise return on asset (ROA) correlations and cross-sectional standard 
deviation of ROAs over the sample period.13  Since Japanese corporations report earnings 
on an annual basis, we are limited to annual ROA figures.  The most striking result 
shown in Figure 5a is the 300% increase (from 0.05 to 0.23) in the average 10-year ROA 
correlations for all firms in the economy.  This suggests that in the 1990s, the fortunes of 
                                                 
13 We use ROA rather than return on equity (ROE) since leverage may differ across firms.   
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 Japanese firms were tied together very tightly and their fundamental economic 
performance moved much more in lock step as compared to the pre-crash period.  Since 
stock returns are related to firm performance through earnings and dividends, the 
dramatic rise in ROA correlations appears to be an important driver to rising return 
correlations and falling idiosyncratic volatility. 
Another interesting fact revealed in Figure 5a is that group affiliated firms 
(keiretsu and main bank (MB)) have higher ROA correlations in the post-bubble period, 
suggesting that the fundamental performances of group firms were also more closely tied 
together during this period.  From Figure 5b, which presents the standard deviations of 
ROA for both non-keiretsu and keiretsu firms, we can observe that the standard 
deviations of ROA for non-keiretsu firms tend to be higher than those of keiretsu firms. 14  
Thus, there is less variation of firm performance among keiretsu firms.   
 [Insert Figure 5a and 5b approximately here] 
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, firm-level volatility increased after 1997.  Although 
the small number of observations does not allow us to conduct a statistical test, it appears 
that the increase in firm-level volatility is related to the recent increase in bankruptcies 
and discussions in the Japanese parliament on the adoption of a new bankruptcy law.15  
As we can see from Figure 5, the standard deviation of ROA had the largest jump for 
keiretsu firms after 1997, when several large banks and firms were allowed to fail.  
Moreover, there is some anecdotal evidence that the market actually looks forward to 
                                                 
14 We have also performed the same analysis on the ROAs of firms with and without main banks 
affiliations. The results, however, are mixed for the whole sample period.  
15 In April 2000, another bankruptcy procedure under a new law (minji-saisei-hou) was introduced.  This 
procedure requires fewer legal steps, and once bankruptcy is filed, managers can stay during the 
restructuring.  Although the number of filings is still low, there were six (seven) cases out of ten (nine) 
bankruptcies in 2000 (2001).  This may contribute to the future improvement of information efficiency 
measures in the Japanese market. 
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 bankruptcy filing of failing firms, rather than prolonged rescue negotiation involving 
their main banks.16  On the other hand, when Daiei, a large retail chain, and its banks 
agreed on a rescue plan including a 400 trillion yen debt-equity swap on January 15, 
2002, the Nikkei average went down by 1% and “the rumor (of the rescue) pushed down 
bank stocks by 7% over the previous week.”17 
 
IV. The Impact of Financial Markets on Economic Activity 
A. A Possible Vicious Cycle in the Capital Formation Process 
 The above analysis has demonstrated that a lack of corporate bankruptcy and the 
presence of group protection may have contributed to an increase in Japanese equity co-
movement.  The role of equity markets, however, is not just a passive reflection of the 
Japanese economy.  
 Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated that equity 
markets help improve the capital allocation process, and thus contribute to economic 
growth.  One theory is that efficient secondary market prices help investors separate good 
from bad investments through a mechanism like Tobin’s Q. Another is that lenders and 
intermediaries use book-to-market ratios to screen out bad credits (Altman, 2002). 
Agency theories argue that pressure from external investors, or managerial ownership, 
encourages managers to pursue value-maximizing investment policies (Jensen, 1986).18  
                                                 
16 For example, when Mycal, a large supermarket chain, filed for minji-saisei-hou bankruptcy on 
September 17, 2001, with 74 trillion yen in debt, the Nikkei average went up by 4% because of  “the 
expectation in the market that the disposition of bad debts by banks would accelerate (Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun (Japan Economic Journal), September 17, 2001).  A similar market reaction was observed when a 
construction company, Sato Kogyo, filed for bankruptcy on March 4, 2002, with a total debt amount of 560 
trillion yen, and the Nikkei average went up by 5%.   
17 Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Japan Economic Journal), January 15, 2002. 
18 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) show that effective laws against misuse of 
minority investors’ funds are a key determinant of their supply of finance to good projects.  
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 Recent empirical work by Wurgler (2000) demonstrates that equity markets actually do 
improve the allocation of capital.  Using a sample of 65 countries, he shows that 
countries with stock markets that impound more firm-specific information into individual 
stock prices – in other words, those that have a smaller R2– do exhibit a better allocation 
of capital, …“which appears to be particularly useful for limiting investment in declining 
industries.”  Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2001) also find that firms in industries in which 
firm-specific return variation is larger exhibit a higher quality of capital budgeting, in the 
sense that their profitability indices (marginal Q ratios) are closer to one.   
 These results suggest that equity markets play an active role in the allocation of 
capital itself.  While misallocation of capital by major banks and keiretsu may cause an 
increase in Japanese equity co-movement, this in turn could lead to further misallocation 
of capital by firms and investors.  As discussed in section III, large equity price co-
movement makes it difficult for investors to distinguish good from bad firms.  As a 
result, some healthy firms will find it difficult to get financing and stay competitive. This 
in turn will lead to more “rescues and bailouts” by business groups, which will trigger 
further reductions in firm-level volatility, thus leading to a vicious cycle in the capital 
formation process. 
We conjecture that this vicious cycle of capital misallocation may help explain the 
long stagnation of the Japanese economy.  Fundamentally, the strength of an economy 
can be measured by whether it allocates its scarce capital efficiently.  Capital should be 
invested in firms that are expected to have high returns, and withdrawn from firms with 
poorer prospects.  To the extent that the Japanese economy continues to misallocate large 
amounts of scarce capital, its recovery will remain illusive, despite its large capital 
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 endowment.  While Japanese corporations and government recently have taken steps to 
address the issue of corporate reorganization, these results indicate that firm-level 
volatility in Japan is still too low (and R2 is too high) compared to other developed 
countries, indicating that Japan’s corporate restructuring may still have a long way to 
go.19 
 
B. Comparison with the U.S. Market in the Pre-War Period  
 In the aftermath of the 1929 crash, the U.S. experienced one of the most severe 
and prolonged recessions in its history.  Thousands of banks failed, one quarter of its 
labor force was unemployed, and the economy did not return to its pre-crash peak until 
World War II.  While the recent Japanese recessions are much more moderate compared 
to the U.S. experience, they have nonetheless lasted on and off for over 10 years.  An 
interesting question is: what are the similarities between the world’s two most prolonged 
recessions? 
 [Insert Figure 6a,b approximately here] 
 To answer this question, we have computed monthly market volatility and 
idiosyncratic volatility from monthly returns of individual stocks using U.S. data from 
1928 to 1946, following the same methodology as in Xu and Malkiel (2001).  We have 
also computed average pair-wise correlation and R2.  The results are presented in Figures 
6a and 6b.  The periods between the two vertical lines are recessions.   
While there are some distinctive features of each market, there is a striking 
similarity between the average R2s (and average pair-wise correlations) of the post-1990 
                                                 
19 At the end of 1999, the average R2 of the Japanese market was 0.25, still much higher than that of the 
U.S. (about 0.08 over the 1993-1998 period) and its own pre-crash historical level.  
 
 
27 
 
 Japanese equity market and the post-1929 U.S. equity market.  We observe a large 
increase in the average R2s for both markets.  While it is reasonable to expect average R2 
to increase during a market crash, it is noteworthy that the average R2s for both countries 
stayed at high levels for such a long period of time.  The average R2 for returns in Japan 
exceeded 30% between 1992 and 1999.  The average R2 for returns in the U.S. exceeded 
40% between 1930 and 1935 and remained above that level between 1937 and 1941.  
 There is no doubt that the underlying economic factors driving the large increases 
in average R2 are different in the two countries.  As we can clearly see from Figure 6a 
and 6b, the rising average R2 in the U.S. is accompanied by a dramatic rise in overall 
market volatility, possibly due to widespread bank failures and corporate bankruptcies.20  
In comparison, the rising average R2 in Japan is accompanied by rapidly falling firm-
level volatility, possibly due to corporate “bailouts” and lack of reorganization.  In both 
cases, high market volatility could affect capital investment by increasing the cost of 
capital.  While the increase in market volatility is less dramatic in Japan than it was in the 
U.S. in the 1930s, the accompanying sharp fall in firm-level volatility made it equally 
difficult for Japanese investors to separate high quality from low quality firms.  This may 
have had a further adverse impact on the capital formation process and thus worsened the 
overall economic conditions.  
 
V. Conclusion   
 This paper documents an abnormal reduction in firm-level volatility after the 
Japanese stock market crash.  We find a significant drop in the variation of systematic 
risk across firms and a sharp increase in Japanese equity co-movement.  In order to 
                                                 
20 See Bernanke (1981) on the possible cause of U.S. depression.  
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 understand the abnormal behavior of idiosyncratic risk in Japan, we examine the impact 
of firm fundamentals as well as bankruptcy on firm-level volatility.  We find that firm 
fortunes were tied together very tightly during the post-crash period.  We discover a 
positive correlation between changes in aggregate firm-level volatility and corporate 
bankruptcies.  There is some circumstantial evidence that increasing bankruptcies after 
1997 have led to higher firm-level volatility.  In addition, we find that idiosyncratic 
volatility for firms with business group affiliations is less responsive to economic 
conditions than that of firms without such affiliations.  These results suggest that the 
sharp fall in firm-level volatility could be due to group protection.   
Based on these results, we hypothesize that the lack of “creative destruction” may 
have contributed to an increase in Japanese equity co-movement and added to the 
difficulty of sorting out healthy firms in the capital allocation process.  Interestingly, we 
find that the volatility behavior of Japanese equities resembles that of U.S. equities 
during the Great Depression, both of which show a prolonged large co-movement in 
equity prices.  In both cases, there seem to be deficiencies in the capital formation 
process, which may have contributed to the worsening of the overall economic 
conditions.     
 To obtain a more accurate measure of idiosyncratic risk, this paper has made a 
number of methodological innovations.  First, we have introduced volume into our asset 
pricing studies.  Because of the close relationship between idiosyncratic risk and 
idiosyncratic volume, examining the time-variation of idiosyncratic volume allows us to 
better understand firm-level volatility in the Japanese equity market.  Second, as a 
robustness check, we employ the duo-factor model of Lo and Wang (2000), which 
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 provides an alternative measure of firm-level volatility and trading volume in a multi-
factor setting.  Third, we use a recently developed consistent statistic by Xu (2001) to 
determine the number of factors in the duo-factor model.  This could provide a more 
accurate measure of idiosyncratic volatility in a multifactor model.  
 This paper raises many interesting research questions.  First, while our results 
indicate an increase in Japanese equity co-movement and a potential negative impact on 
its capital allocation, it would be interesting to examine whether this increase actually 
leads to reduced efficiency in Japanese firm capital budgeting.  Second, our results 
indicate that a reduction in idiosyncratic volatility is accompanied by rising overall 
market volatility in Japan.  It would be useful to examine whether changes in 
idiosyncratic risk have affected asset pricing.21  We leave these topics for future research.  
 
                                                 
21 Goyal and Santa-Clara (2002), for example, have examined the issue of whether idiosyncratic risk has 
affected asset pricing in the U.S.  
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 Appendix 
Let us briefly introduce the framework we adopt from Lo and Wang (2000).  
Assume that asset i returns are generated by an approximate K-factor model: 
           Rit = Et(Rit ) + f1t βi1 + ... + fKt βiK + eit           i = 1,...,N;     t = 1,...,T  ,         (A1)  
where ft '=(f1t,...,fKt) is a vector of unobservable pervasive shocks, (βi1,..., βiK) is a vector 
of factor loadings which are constant over the sample period, and eit represents an 
idiosyncratic risk specific to asset j at time t.  As discussed in Chamberlain (1983), the 
above economy implies the following linear pricing relationship if there exist K well-
diversified portfolios: 
  Et( Rit ) = rft + λ1t βi1 +...+ λKt βiK,                                     (A2)  
where (λ1t,..., λKt) is a vector of risk premiums corresponding to the pervasive shocks  
(f1t,...,fKt), and rft is the return on a riskless asset.  
 Parallel to Equation (A1), Lo and Wang (2000) derive the proposition that the 
turnover of each stock also has an approximate K’-factor structure under certain 
regularity conditions.  More formally, we have:  
 τit  = τi +  δi1g1t + ... +  δiKgK’t + ξit                 (A3) 
Here, δik is the exposure of firm i to economy–wide liquidity shocks gkt. gkt could be 
functions of fkt but it is not specified in the model and τi is a constant. ξit has mean zero 
and it is assumed to be orthogonal to gkt.  Since the models of (A1) and (A3) are both 
multi-factor models, we will simply call them the duo-factor model for return and 
volume.  Our objective here is to use (A1) and (A3) to derive alternative measures of 
idiosyncratic volatility and turnover.  
 
 
31 
 
  An important issue in measuring idiosyncratic volatility and turnover is the 
correct identification of the number of factors in (A1) and (A3).  Until now, this crucial 
parameter is often assumed, rather than determined by the data.22  This paper introduces a 
formal statistical procedure that can consistently estimate the number of factors from 
observed data.  This procedure is developed by Xu (2001) under the assumption that both 
N and T converge to infinity.  This extension is of empirical relevance because it fully 
exploits the advantage of a large panel data set.  In addition, our empirical study employs 
an approximate factor structure for both returns and trading volume.  Our results hold 
under heteroskedasticity in both the time and cross-section dimensions, thus rendering 
them more general than the results of Connor and Korajczyk (1993) who assume 
homoskedasticity over time.   
                                                 
22 Brown and Weinstein (1983) emphasize the importance of obtaining correct estimates on the number of 
factors. They point out that the common practice of using an over-estimate can cause spurious rejection of 
asset pricing models. They note: “…the rejection of the five and seven factor versions is to be expected if 
the three factor version is correct.” 
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table shows some of the summary statistics for Japanese equity markets over different 
episodes.  Except for “RM”, which is based on the value-weighted market index return, all the 
statistics are computed based on the statistics of individual stocks in the specified period. In 
particular, σi,IV is the root mean squared residuals from the same CAPM that computes βi,CAPM 
and R2CAPM.  σi,TV is the return volatility of individual stocks. iη  denotes the average turnover 
over time of individual stocks, while log( iME ) is the average market capitalization for 
individual stocks. 
 RM iR  βi,CAPM R2CAPM σi,IV  σi,TV  log( iME ) iη  
    1975-79     
Median  0.015 0.997 0.117 0.085 0.093 9.523 0.037 
Mean 0.016 0.016 0.999 0.132 0.090 0.096 9.586 0.050 
S.D. 0.033 0.010 0.580 0.095 0.036 0.037 1.422 0.049 
    1980-84     
Median  0.012 0.951 0.086 0.081 0.085 9.919 0.027 
Mean 0.013 0.014 0.996 0.103 0.087 0.091 10.010 0.040 
S.D. 0.026 0.011 0.653 0.083 0.040 0.041 1.473 0.040 
    1985-89     
Median  0.028 1.027 0.157 0.097 0.107 10.889 0.049 
Mean 0.027 0.028 1.024 0.172 0.106 0.115 11.036 0.056 
S.D. 0.041 0.012 0.447 0.113 0.039 0.038 1.440 0.039 
    1990-94     
Median  -0.004 1.016 0.538 0.076 0.116 11.147 0.022 
Mean -0.004 -0.004 1.011 0.513 0.080 0.117 11.270 0.027 
S.D. 0.083 0.007 0.321 0.168 0.024 0.029 1.373 0.022 
    1995-99     
Median  -0.007 0.983 0.407 0.085 0.115 10.573 0.021 
Mean -0.004 -0.005 1.006 0.387 0.093 0.122 10.777 0.027 
S.D. 0.075 0.012 0.519 0.188 0.039 0.049 1.507 0.024 
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 Table 2: Test of Significance for the Difference between 1990-1994 Period and Other 
Periods 
This table provides the significant test of selected statistics of 1990-1994 against other time 
periods. This comparison period has 1521 stocks.  Test statistics for the hypothesis of equal 
standard deviation is computed based on an F test, while that of equal mean is based on a t test. In 
particular, σi,IV is the root mean squared residuals from the same CAPM that computes βi,CAPM 
and R2CAPM.  iη  denotes the average turnover over time of individual stocks. 
 
 No. βi,CAPM R2CAPM σi,IV  σi,IV   iη  iη  
 Obs. S.D. Mean Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
        
    1975-79    
Statistic 1174 3.268 -69.56 8.498 2.165 16.28 5.171 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
    1980-84    
Statistic 1275 4.152 -79.29 5.037 2.710 11.36 3.505 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
    1985-89    
Statistic 1352 1.942 -62.91 20.87 2.648 24.94 3.288 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
    1995-99    
Statistic 1606 2.624 -19.71 10.86 2.668 -0.167 1.220 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.566 0.000 
 
 
37 
 
Table 3: Time-Series Analysis of Market and Aggregate Idiosyncratic Volatility 
This table provides the significant tests for stochastic trend vs. time trend in both market volatility and idiosyncratic volatility over the entire 
sample period from 1975-1999.  Similar test statistics are also given for the post Plaza Accord subsample period from 1985-1999. All monthly 
volatilities are computed using rolling statistics.  Three measures of idiosyncratic volatilities are used.  They are σIV according to Xu and Malkiel 
(2001), the root mean square of the CAPM residuals σCAPM, IV, and residuals from three factor models of Fama and French (1993) σFF3,IV.  
Model: ln(σt) = µ + ρ ln(σt-1) + γ t + α1 ∆ln(σt-1) + … + α6 ∆ln(σt-6)  + εt      
 
Entire Sample Period: 1975-1999 Sub Sample Period: 1985-1999 
 µ γ ρ R2  µ γ ρ R2 
   Market Volatility
Estimates
 
        
        
        
       
        
        
       
        
        
       
         
        
-.1728 .00016 .8948 0.901 
T -3.63 2.44 31.67
ADF T(ρ-1) -37.38
 
 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (σIV) 
  Estimates
 
-.0486 .00001 .9560 .937 -.0975 -.00018 .8958 .950
T -2.68 0.54 58.3 -2.98 -2.12 25.2
ADF T(ρ-1) -18.75 -35.92
 
 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (σCAPM,IV) 
  Estimates
 
-.0438 .00001 .9596 .949 -.1078 -.00023 .8803 .948
T -2.75 0.46 65.9 -3.32 -2.42 24.1
ADF T(ρ-1) -19.96 -46.84
 
 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (σFF3F,IV) 
  Estimates -.0351 .00001 .9699 .963 -.1194 -.00023 .8782 .966
(Std.E) -2.44 0.58 78.0 -3.58 -2.78 25.4
ADF T(ρ-1) -16.01 -74.82
Table 4: Test of Number of Factors in the Excess Return and Turnover Models for Balanced Panels 
This table reports the average incremental coefficient of determination from regressing individual stock returns (or turnover) on each statistical 
factor extracted using the “MEC” approach of Xu (2001).   The number of factors is determined based on the test statistics suggested by Xu 
(2001). 
Period ∆R21  ∆R22 ∆R23 ∆R24 ∆R25 ∆R26 ∆R27 ∆R28 ∆R29 ∆R210 # factors R21,..,10 
             
     turn       
            
       
       
       
       
       
      over       
             
       
       
       
       
Stock r
 
e
1975-79 
 
     0.135  
 
     0.060  
 
     0.052      0.044      0.028      0.026  
 
     0.024  
 
     0.022      0.021      0.021 3      0.247 
 
1980-84 
 
     0.107  
 
     0.066  
 
     0.048      0.035      0.031      0.028  
 
     0.027  
 
     0.025      0.023      0.022 3      0.222 
 
1985-89 
 
     0.176  
 
     0.095  
 
     0.042      0.034      0.031      0.025  
 
     0.023  
 
     0.021      0.020      0.019 3      0.313 
 
1990-94 
 
     0.515  
 
     0.049  
 
     0.030      0.024      0.022      0.018  
 
     0.014  
 
     0.014      0.013      0.013 4      0.619 
 
1995-99 
 
     0.389  
 
     0.048  
 
     0.030      0.026      0.026      0.025  
 
     0.020  
 
     0.019      0.019      0.018 3      0.467 
 
Turn
1975-79 
 
     0.123  
 
     0.076  
 
     0.057      0.048      0.039      0.031  
 
     0.031  
 
     0.027      0.025      0.024 4      0.305 
 
1980-84 
 
     0.101  
 
     0.062  
 
     0.052      0.042      0.040      0.035  
 
     0.033  
 
     0.030      0.028      0.026 3      0.215 
 
1985-89 
 
     0.103  
 
     0.067  
 
     0.055      0.053      0.044      0.036  
 
     0.035  
 
     0.029      0.027      0.026 5      0.322 
 
1990-94 
 
     0.208  
 
     0.074  
 
     0.061      0.058      0.038      0.037  
 
     0.031  
 
     0.028      0.025      0.022 6      0.476 
 
1995-99      0.137       0.117       0.053      0.045      0.041      0.035       0.031       0.028      0.026      0.024 5      0.391 
 
Table 5: Regression of Changes in Equity Market Characteristics on Bankruptcy and GDP growth (1977-1999) 
Equity market characteristics used are average R2 for excess returns using the market model R2(Rt), average R2 for turnover using the 
market model R2 (To),  average correlation for excess returns among stocks Corr(Rt), and average correlation for turnovers among 
stocks Corr (To). The first line provides parameter estimates. The second line gives the t-statistics. 
 
 Constant   Bankruptcy GDP Adj. R2 
∆Idio. Risk -0.003   0.001 0.035 0.020
 -0.477  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
1.526 0.393  
 
∆R2(Return) 0.023 -0.006 -0.135 0.125
  0.943 -2.144 -0.379
 
∆R2(Turnover)  0.035 -0.004 -0.511 0.267
  2.565 -2.682 -2.600
 
∆Corr(Return)  0.012 -0.003 0.178 0.101
  0.595 -1.495 0.636
 
∆Corr(Turnover)  0.003 -0.002 0.068 0.079
  0.307 -1.498 0.443
 
 Table 6: Regression of Difference of Equity Market Characteristics on IP growth (1977-1999) 
The first line provides parameter estimates. The second line gives the t-statistics. 
 
1977-1989 Sample  1990-1996 Sample 
Constant  IP Adj. R2  Constant  IP Adj. R2 
A: Keiretsu        
Diff. Idio. Risk (nonKeiretsu-Keiretsu)  0.000      0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.014 
(CAPM) -1.960     0.527  2.955 -0.138  
        
Diff. Idio. Risk (nonKeiretsu-Keiretsu)  -0.001      0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.008 0.087 
(XU) -2.796     0.405  -9.438 -2.790  
        
Diff. Idio. Volume (nonKeiretsu-Keiretsu)  -0.002      0.012 0.030 0.000 -0.005 0.103 
(CAPM) -7.151     2.481  0.637 -3.023  
        
Diff. Idio. Volume (nonKeiretsu-Keiretsu)  -0.003      0.014 0.030 0.000 -0.005 0.090 
(XU) -7.545     2.470  0.177 -2.825  
        
B. Main Banks        
Diff. Idio. Risk (nonMain Bank-Main Bank) -0.003      0.019 0.102 -0.002 -0.006 0.163 
(CAPM) -10.16     4.460  -22.43 -3.846  
        
Diff. Idio. Risk (nonMain Bank-Main Bank) -0.003      0.019 0.092 -0.003 -0.013 0.094 
(XU) -9.046     4.229  -17.58 -2.894  
        
Diff. Idio. Volume (nonMain Bank-Main Bank) -0.003      0.011 0.033 -0.001 -0.006 0.127 
(CAPM) -12.23     2.587  -11.95 -3.365  
        
Diff. Idio. Volume (nonMain Bank-Main Bank) -0.004      0.012 0.036 -0.001 -0.008 0.165 
(XU) -13.55     2.700  -11.85 -3.879  
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Figure 1. Cumulative Returns  and Trading Volume
(TSE Value-Weighted Index)
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 Figure 2.  Annualized Market Volatility, Idiosyncratic Volatility, and Trading Volume
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 Figure 3a. Average R2 Statistics of Returns and Turnover
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 Figure 3b.  Return and Volume Correlations among Individual Stocks
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 Figure 4a.  Bankruptcies in Japan
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 Figure 4b.  Bankruptcies of TSE Listed Firms
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Figure 5a. Ten Year ROA Correlations 
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 Figure 5b. Standard Deviation of ROA's
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Figure 6a. Market and Idiosyncratic Volatility in the U.S. Market: 1928-1947
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Figure 6b. R2 in the U.S. Market: 1928-1946
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